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In a closed and stationary economy, real government revenue from the
Issue of fiat money Is maximized when the rate of issue is such that the
elasticity of the demand for real money balances with respect to the rate
of inflation is unity. However, Friedman [1971] has shown that this result
for a stationary economy does not carry over to a growing economy. In the
case of a growing economy, the optimum rate of inflation for the maximiza
tion of government revenue from the issue of fiat money is lower than for
a stationary economy.
In this paper, we extend Friedman's analysis to consider government
revenue from money issue in open economies with fixed exchange rates. We
show that, in the absence of an agreement to maximize combined revenue
from money issue, attempts by governments to individually maximize revenue
will bring about a rate of inflation which is much greater than the rate
at which combined government revenue is maximized.
The Model
Assume a two-country world in which the exchange rate between the
currencies of the two countries is permanently fixed at unity,The
nominal stock of high powered or base money (M) in each country is equal
to the amount of domestic credit (D) issued by the government or central
bank plus the country's net International reserves (R):
= Di + R^; i = 1, 2 (1)
where the subscripts indicate the country in question. A country's net
International reserves consist of its holdings of International reserve
assets (e.g., gold, SDR's) and monetary claims against the government of
the other country less the other country's holding of monetary claims against
the domestic government;
SR. = R (2)
i
where R is the nominal world stock of international reserve assets and is
assumed fixed.
Let
= price level
= population
« nominal income
y. « p~M~ ® capita real income
i i
m. « p ^ = per capita stock of real base money.
1
Also let g with a subscript represent the relative rate of growth of the
subscript variable, e.g., g = d(lnDJ/dt = (1/D.) (dB./dt) = the relative
1 1 i
rate of growth of domestic credit in country _i.
To keep the model simple, we assume that there are no transportation
costs or other barriers to trade between the two countries, all goods are
traded, and competition prevails. These assumptions together with the
fixed unitary exchange rate imply that P. = P. and g ® g .
12 ^1^2
Since we are interested in equilibrium positions after all adjustments
in response to inflation have taken place, we regard g^ as both the actual
and the expected rate of price change in both countries.
The demand for real base money balances per capita in each country
is given by
"i = fiCXi. gp). (3)
These demand functions are derived in part from demand functions for per
capita real money balances under the assumption that commercial bank reserve
requirement ratios are fixed. Like Friedman, we have omitted interest rates
from thse demand functions for simplicity, although to the extent that real
Interest rates are affected by changes in the rate of inflation their
2/
influence upon the demand for base money should be taken into account.—^
Multiplication of both sides of equation (3) by the price level and
population yields the aggregate nominal demand for base money;
= PNi • fiCyi, gp). (4)
Take the time derivative of the logarithm of equation (4) to obtain
gjj + gp + n g
"i "i ^ ^i ^1
(5)
where T[ is the elasticity of the demand for real base money per capita with
yt
respect to real income per capita. In obtaining (3), we have assumed the
time derivative of to be zero, so equation (5) is valid only for alterna
tive steady-state rates of inflation.
Let Wj^ = (M^ + the proportion of the world stock of base money
which is held by country 1, and W2 = (1 - w^^) - + M2). If the demand
for base money equals the supply in each country, the rate of growth of the
world demand for base money is
d d d , d
"1 2
2
From equations (1) and (2),
(6)
+ R. (7)
Hence, the rate of growth of the world supply of base money is
1 . ""z 1
" dt dt
'•"l 1 "l °1 ^ ^ 1 !!2 ^
" dt dt
=gj,^ s^ +gp^Cl - w^)S2 (8)
where s^ = D^/M^.
Equating the rates of growth of the world demand for base money,
equation (6), and the world supply of base money, equation (8), we obtain
Sp = "l h +
- \ ^2 '^^ (9)
Real government revenue per period of time generated by the government
of the ith country through the issue of domestic credit is
dD. ,
= -zr ?
and for both countries together
dD dD
GR^ + GR^ =^ p+^ 5
° P ^ ^2
8p) (Sjj 8p Tl 8 )
1 - ^1 ^1
^2 * ^2 ^^2' ®p^ Sp 'Hy 8y )•2 ' ^2 ^2
The governments may cooperate to maximize the sum of their revenues
from the issue of domestic credit or each government may act individually
to maximize the value of its own revenue.
(11)
Case I: Governments Cooperate to Maximize Combined Revenue from the
Issue of Domestic Credit
To maximize their combined revenue from the issue of domestic credit,
the governments select that rate of inflation which yields a maximum value
for equation (11), i.e., the rate of inflation at which
or
d(GR. + GR )
— « gpX 1 +
w.
dH,
+ . £2(72, gp/i + ^
• (Su, + 8p + Tl„ 8„ )•1 "^1 ^^l'
+ • (gjj^ + +Tly^ gy^)
+
Ml.
^ •** Sy "d^ ®P "Hy S )
^1 \ ^ ^1 ^1
«2-
= 0
1 - w^ \ dgp ®p \ ^
1 + S
^2 ^'2^ (%, +«P ^^2 ^^2^ 1=
d In
dgn
d In ^2 ^^2*
(12)
(13)
where t). ^ is the elasticity of the per capita demand for real base money
^ >Op
in the ^th country with respect to the rate of inflation.—^
Once the combined revenue maximizing (CRM) rate of inflation has been
obtained from equation (13), it can be substituted into equation (9) to
yield the infinite set of combinations of g_ and g_ which maximize combined^ Di 1^2
governraent revenue from domestic credit issue. The g^g^ line in Figure 1 is
the locus of such combinations of g^. and g_ .Di D2
If the governments agree to pursue the CRM rate of inflation, they
must also agree upon a particular point on the SpSp 3-ocus or a particular
distribution of the revenue gains. It is to the interest of the government
of country 1 to have an agreed-upon point on the g*g^ locus which is as far
to the left as possible. For example, at point A on the locus, g = 0 and
JJ2
all of the combined government revenue from the issue of credit goes to the
government of country 1. For points on the locus to the left of A, g-. <0
JJ2
and the government of country 1 gets more than the total combined govern
ment revenue from domestic credit issue. Similarly, it is to the interest
of the government of country 2 to have the agree-upon point as far to the
right on the gjg* locus as possible.
Moreover, no point on the g*g* locus is simultaneously optimal for
both governments acting as individual revenue maximizers. Provided that
it believes the rate of credit issue by the other government is invariant
with respect to its own actions, at least one of the governments will always
have an incentive to push the rate of inflation above the CRM rate. This
can be shown in a straightforward manner if it is assumed that each govern
ment determines its rate of domestic credit expansion making the Cournot
assumption that the foreign rate of credit expansion is fixed.
Case II: Governments Act Individually to Maximize Revenue from the Issue
of Domestic Credit
Equation (10) for the government of country 1 can be written as
follows:
Figure 1
^ 1 " ^dt ^ dt y P dt P
P ®M^ P ®M2 ' dt P ^2 M2
Ml
+^2 • f2(y2. 8p)(S„^ +gp + 8y^ - 8^2 "2>-
To maximize its revenue from the issue of domestic credit under the
assumption that the rate of credit expansion in the other country is fixed,
the government of country 1 selects the rate of inflation at which
dGR, ,
d8p " \ ' ®P^0" ®y, dg„ ^®D " ®D ^ ^ ^1 "^^P
'2 ^2
dfi
y-+N2 • ^2^^2' h^Q- ®y2 dgpO
+ N1 ' ®P ^y, ®y, ^1 ^ yi ^1 ^®p
dCGR^ + GR2) ^2
2 ^2 ^^2 *^^2 ^®P
8n ®9 Ho " 0-dgp P -^02 "2 'I2,gp
Suppose that g^ = 0, i.e., the government of country 2 is neither increasing
"2
nor decreasing its domestic credit. Then the value of which satisfies
equation (15a) is the CRM rate or that rate at which d(GRj^ + GR2)/<it = 0.
This means that point A (on the g*g* locus) in Figure 1 is a point of
maximum revenue for the government of country 1 even when it acts as an
individual revenue maximizer. On the other hand, since < 0, if
g- > 0 (g„ < 0) the rate of inflation which satisfies (13a) is greater
D2 D2
(less) than the CRM rate. Indeed, the larger is the value of g^ , the
greater is the revenue maximizing rate of inflation for the government of
country 1. Given g_ and [from equation (15a)] country I's corresponding
desired g^, the optimum value of can be calculated from equation (9).
The g^ g* curve in Figure 1 shows the revenue maximizing rate of domestic
^1
credit expansion for the government of country 1 at given values of g .
"2
Similarly, equation (10) for the government of country 2 can be
written as
2 ' ^2 ^2
+ N, • fi(y^. Sp)(8„ + gp + n g - gjj^ 8^). (14b)
1 •'I n
To maximize its revenue from domestic credit issue under the assumption
that gj^ is fixed, the government of country 2 selects the rate of inflation
at which
dGR2 d(GRj^ + GR^)
dt =8d^ dC P
Then the value of g^^ and the corresponding desired rate of inflation can
be substituted into equation (9) to obtain the revenue maximizing rate of
domestic credit expansion for the government of country 2. The g* g*
^2 ^2
curve in Figure 1 shows such revenue maximizing values of for given
and assumed fixed values of g -
^1
Point Bin Figure 1 (at the intersection of the and 802^02
curves) gives the stable equilibrium values of g^^^ and g^^^ when both govern
ments act as individual revenue maximizers. It is obvious that this
combination of and g_ results in a rate of inflation which is greaterDi D2
than the CRM rate.
A Special Case
In order to provide some notion as to the magnitude of the difference
between the CRM rate of inflation and the equilibrium rate which would
result if both governments act as individual revenue maximizers, we employ
Friedman's special case of the demand for money:
4 = ii(yi) •
This function has the following convenient properties:
d In (m^)
^ - « -bdgp
and
d-n
dgp
In order to facilitate comparisons with Friedman's results, we assume
that the two countries are identical (i.e., the parameters of their base
money demand functions are identical, y^ * y«, g„ ® 8„ > ® "
gjj ) and 8^ = S2 « Wj, = = 1/2. Table 1 shows both the equilibrium
rates of inflation when the governments act as individual revenue maximizers
and (In parentheses) the CRM rate of Inflation for various alternative values
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of g , gjj, V[ ) and b. Note that when the CRM rate of inflation is nonzero,
the equilibrium individual revenue maximizing rate of inflation is always
at least twice as large.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have been concerned with government revenue from the
issue of fiat money in open economies with fixed exchange rates. We have
shown that if each government attempts to individually maximize its revenue,
under the assumption that the foreign rate of money expansion is fixed, an
equilibrium rate of inflation would result which is much greater than the
rate at which combined government revenue is maximized. We have analyzed
a two-country world, but the model can easily be extented to include more
countries. Indeed, it would seem that the larger the number of countries
the less likely it is the governments will cooperate to pursue the combined
revenue maximizing rate of inflation.
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Footnotes
1. This involves no essential loss of generality. The model can easily
be extented to a multi-country world (see Johnson [1972]). Similarly,
it la not necessary that the exchange rate be fixed at unity.
2. We also follow Friedman in assuming that real incomes are invariant to the
inflation rate.
3. Essentially the same equation is developed in Johnson [1972].
4. If the two countries are identical, i.e., y = y , g = g , N. = N-,
^ ^1 y2 ^ 2
~ ^1^ ) = ^2^ combined revenue maximizing
rate of inflation is the rate at which
simultaneously in both countries. This is the same solution obtained
by Friedman [1971] for a closed economy. However, if the two countries
are not identical, there is no reason to expect that a particular value
of gp can be found at which equation (13a) is satisfied simultaneously
for both country 1 and 2.
